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A Monetary Cure for the High Dollarl
It is now quite clear that the current economic
expansion's initial rapid pace stopped in mid-1984.
From the third quarter of1984through the second
quarterof1985, real GNP grew atan annual
average rate of less than 2 percent - far below the
average 7 percent growth in the first six quarters of
the recovery that began at the end of1982. The
overall slowdown in the economy has caused
some observers to call for a more expansionary
monetary policy.
To evaluate this recommendation, it is important
to realize that the economic slowdown is not
evenly distributed across sectors. Those sectors
largely insulated from foreign competition (such as
housing, the service industry, and industries with
important defense business) are booming, whereas
sectors such as mining, agriculture and most
manufacturers show little or no growth. The cause
of this disparity is the high value of the dollar in the
foreign exchanges. This Letterevaluates the likely
effects ofa more expansionary U.s. monetary
policy in the contextof imbalances created by a
strong dollar.
The high dollar
Many analysts attribute the overall strength ofthe
dollar since 1980mainly to the increasing federal
government budget deficit. The federal deficit
grew from $58 billion in 1981 to $110 billion in
1982, and furtherto $195 billion in 1983. Since
then, it has leveled offat roughly $200 billion.
In aclosed economy (one without trade and finan-
ciallinkages to other, foreign economies), the fiscal
stimulus to aggregate demand coming from an
increased budget deficitwould lead to higher real,
or inflation-adjusted, interest rates and, assuming
some economic slack, an expansion of real output
and employment. Higher real interest rates,
however, would serve to offset some of the fiscal
stimulus by "crowding out" business and house-
hold expenditures that are sensitive to higher
interest rates. Housing, business plant and equip-
ment, and consumer durables are the sectors tradi-
tionally hit hard by high real interest rates in a
closed economy.
In an open economy (one with extensive trade and
financial ties to the rest ofthe world) with flexible
exchange rates, a fiscal stimulus and associated
higher government credit demands do not
necessarily lead to crowding out ofdomestic
interest-sensitive sectors. Instead, upward pres-
sures on interest rates are likely to attract foreign
capital into the country and cause the country's
exchange rate to appreciate. The recent U.S.
experience fits this paradigm.
Ofcourse, factors other than the federal fiscal
stimulus probably played some role in the
appreciation ofthe dollar. Among those commonly
pointed out are the perception of the u.s. as a safe
investment haven and optimistic growth prospects
for the u.s. economy compared to those for most
other nations.
The impact of the high dollar
Regardless of which factors have played thedomi-
nant role, the appreciation of the dollar has
allowed foreign producers to improve their com-
petitive position in the u.s. by cutting their dollar
prices while still reaping higher profits in terms of
their own currencies. At the same time, the price of
u.s. goods abroad has increased. The result is that
u.s. producers that compete with imports or that
export theirgoods have found their position
deteriorating in relation to their foreign competi-
tors. Consequently, U.s. industries that produce
goods that can be exported or imported relatively
easily, and hence are exposed to foreign competi-
tion - the so-called "tradeable goods" industries
- have contracted, orat least have not expanded
at the same pace as nontradeable goods industries
(such as housing and service sectors). Crowding
out in the U.S. therefore has manifested itself
largely in tradeable goods rather than domestic
interest-sensitive sectors.
It is important to emphasize that the slowdown in
U.s. tradeable goods manufactures is not aconse-
quence ofdeficientaggregate demand (total
purchases ofgoods and services). What has
changed is the proportion of U.S. aggregate
demand being satisfied by domestic producers.
While production ofU.S. goods and services hasFRBSF
averaged 4.8 percent real growth per year since
the end of1982, real domestic spending on both
domestic and foreign goods has grown faster still
- ata 6.3 percent annual rate. The difference has
been met by net imports. More specifically, partic-
ularly slow real GNP growth rates in the third
quarter of1983 (1.6 percent) and the first quarter
of1984 (0.3 percent) were directly attributable to
surging sales of imported goods. Aggregate output,
therefore, is growing slowly not because aggregate
demand is sluggish, but because imports are
satisfying a large share of the growth in aggregate
demand.
What happens to the resources that become
unemployed in the tradeable goods sector? If it
were easy to move them from one industry to
another, these resources would be moved rapidly
to the nontradeable goods sector. In fact,
resources cannot be transferred costlessly or
rapidly across industries. Workers must search and
obtain information about newjobs, acquire new
skills and relocate. Similarly, employers must seek
out new opportunities in the nontradeable.sector
and then set up the necessary production facilities.
Thus, there will be a period of transition during
which more resources than normal will remain out
of use. This makes total output and employment in
the economy lowerthan otherwise.
It is noteworthy that the loss in output and higher
unemploymentaccompanies the recent reduction
in the inflation rate - a phenomenon that has so
often been vaunted as an advantage of the strong
dollar. The lower inflation rate reflects little or no
price change in the tradeable goods sector and
continuing price hikes in the nontradeable goods
sector. In the past five quarters, prices in industries
such as manufacturing and mining have increased
about1 percent at an annual rate while prices in
the service industries and housing have increased
at around 5 percent. Thus, small price increases in
the tradeable goods sector actually represent a
situation in which the price of tradeable com-
modities has been falling relative to the prices of
nontradeable goods. This decline then sets up a
reallocation of resources, with its attendant dis-
locations discussed above.
The implications of increasing money growth
Against this backdrop, what would be the likely
effects ofa significant monetary expansion in the
near future? The answer depends upon how
markets interpret the monetary authority's actions.
If financial markets perceive the monetary expan-
sion to be a short-term measure, that is, ifthey are
convinced that the Fed is still concerned about
inflation, the dollar is not likely to fall by much. If
markets believe that the increased money growth
signals increased concern about reviving a tem-
porarily lagging economy, however, the dollar is
likely to decline sharply.
Consider what may happen to real GNP growth in
the face of monetary expansion if the dollar does
not decline sharply. What effect will the increased
aggregate demand have on domestic tradeable
goods industries? A high dollar continues to make
it cheaper to buy the same commodities from
abroad. Therefore, to the extent that the increase
in money growth increases the domestic demand
for tradeable goods, this demand is likely to be
satisfiedclargely by foreign producers, and imports
will rise. It is not clear how large the increase in
domestic tradeables production will be.
Developments over the last three quarters provide
some evidence on thisissue. The level ofindustrial
production - consisting largely of tradeable goods
- has increased only about 1 percent from
November1984toJune 1985. At the same time,
money has been expanding ata rapid rate. M1
grew at an annual rate above 11 percent from the
fourth quarterof1984toJune ofthis year. Even
allowing for lags in the effects of money growth on
output and the recent decline in velocity (the
speed at which money circulates in the economy),
the small response of industrial production has
surprised many observers.
If the tradeable goods sector is unlikely to respond
significantly to a monetary stimulus perceived as
temporary, it is reasonable to ask whether the non-
tradeable goods sector will grow fast enough to
compensate, i.e., fast enough to keep aggregate
unemploymentfrom rising. How quickly the non-
tradeable goods sector can expand without setting
off inflation is likely to depend upon how quickly
unemployed resources in the tradeable goods
industries can be transferred to the nontradeable
goods. This will not happen quickly. In the short-
term, increasing aggregate demand is likely to lead
to rising nontradeable goods prices with only
modest rises in output. For the economy as a
whole, this suggests that the rate of unemploy-
ment would not drop significantly while the rate of
inflation would increase. Evidence cited above
indicates that the nontradeable goods sector in theMONETARY POLICY OBJECTIVES FOR 1985 AND 1986
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u.s. economy is already expanding somewhat
faster than is consistent with stable prices.
Now, what happens in the case where the dollar
does decline sharply due to monetary expansion?
Obviously, domestic tradeable goods industries
will become more competitive. However, condi-
tions in the tradeable goods sector will not
improve immediately because the volume of
imports and exports reacts to changes in prices
with a lag. Furthermore, it takes time to re-start fac-
tories and redeploy workers to increase domestic
output of tradeable goods significantly.
Gradually, imports will begin to decrease and
exports to increase as the effects ofthe lower real
exchange rate make themselves felt. However, as
the higher growth rate of money persists, another
factor comes into play - domestic prices begin to
rise. Thus, the real value ofthe dollar (which is
the nominal value adjusted for the price leveD will
increase again. Given the prevailing nominal
exchange rate, rising U.s. prices relative to foreign
prices make it favorable for American consumers to
purchase tradeable goods from abroad once more.
That is the reason monetary theory suggests that
although the nominal value of the dollar exchange
rate would be permanently lowerfollowing a
monetary stimulus, the real value ofthe dollar -
and the corresponding improvement in U.s. inter-
national price competitiveness - would even-
tually return to its former level.
longerterm policy considerations
For the short-run, the analysis above implies that
raising the rate ofgrowth of the money supply is
not likely to be very beneficial. Because it is not
obvious that prevailing conditions in industries
such as manufacturing and mining are the result of
deficient aggregate demand, it is notclear how
much remedies used to address adeficiency of
aggregate demand can accomplish. As the mone-
tary expansion continues at an increased rate, the
dollar will most likely fall, perhaps quite dra-
matically. But, as discussed above, any drop in the
real value of the dollar induced by monetary
expansion will likely only be temporary. The
efficacy of monetary expansion then depends
upon how long the factors responsible for the high
dollar are expected to prevail.
There is considerable uncertainty about whether
the factors underlying the strength of the dollar are
ofa temporary or permanent nature. If policy-
makers believe that these factors are likely to be
shortlived, then more expansionary monetary
policy would be appropriate. Such apolicywould
slow the shift in resources from the tradeable
goods sector to the nontradeable goods sector,
and would also help avoid the costs ()f the reverse
adjustment that would become necessary when
the real value of the dollar declined atsome future
point (e.g., when the federal budget deficits de-
cline). This saving in resource costs may well out-
weigh the short-term costs, such as higher infla-
tion, discussed above.
If the factors responsible for the high dollar have a
large long-term component (e.g., continued large
u.s. budget deficits or the perception of the U.S. as
a safe haven for foreign investments), then the
costs of adecrease in the real value of the dollar
induced by monetary expansion are likely to out-
weigh the gain. The gain is the short-term increase
in output, which lasts only until the real value of
the dollar returns to its original level. The losses
consist of new inflationary pressures and the prob-
ability that monetary policy would be hindering
the adjustment of resources necessitated by the
strong dollar.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)
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Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 191,990 - 519 10,437 5.7
Loans and Leases1 6 173,780 - 380 11,196 6.8
Commercial and Industrial 51,281 - 366 1,335 2.6
Real estate 63,615 - 27 2,975 4.9
Loans to Individuals 34,956 145 6,145 21.3
Leases 5,390 1 374 7.4
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,403 - 119 - 552 - 4.6
OtherSecurities2 6,807 - 21 - 206 - 2.9
Total Deposits 195,212 - 2,218 9,020 4.8
Demand Deposits 44,871 - 1,975 2,713 6.4
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 30,128 - 1,234 2,024 7.2
OtherTransaction Balances4 13,574 - 244 1,491 12.3
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 136,766 1 4,814 3.6
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 44,884 56 6,895 18.1
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000or more 37,696 50 - 2,886 - 7.1
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 21,277 - 2,631 1,740 8.9
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)jDeficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Excludes U.s. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TI&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change